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Peterson, Karlawash and Largent (PK&L) offer a defense of supported decision making in health
care for people with dynamic and diminishing capacity. They are to be warmly commended for
bringing supported decision making to the fore, and their discussion has many strengths. First
and foremost, they call attention to the many flaws with reliance on surrogate decision makers in
health care. Surrogates, from guardians to holders of powers of attorney, may lack nuance and
the ability to adjust to changed circumstances, diminish the perceived self-worth of people who
no longer are regarded as capable of making decisions, and result in unacceptable levels of
paternalism. Second, their discussion recognizes that supported decision making is not an
informal arrangement. Rather, it is a process that gives formal legal recognition to the
involvement of others as assistive devices in decision making. (Not incidentally, all but one of
the state statutes that formally recognize these agreements also gives health care providers
immunity from liability or professional discipline for good faith reliance on a support agreement
not known to be invalid.) Third, their discussion relies on insights from the social model of
disability and understandings of autonomy as relational. Finally, they recognize many of the
serious challenges to supportive decision-making, including whether persons have sufficient
capacity to enter support agreements, whether support arrangements might lead to abuse and
exploitation, how the U.S. might transition to supported decision making, how supported
decision making comports with informed consent, and whether there is evidence that supported
decision making realizes its stated goals. They answer these challenges by suggesting further
research and the involvement of bioethicists in resolving concerns.
This brief commentary addresses what I regard as the thorniest challenge to supported
decision making: how to determine if a supported decision really is the decision of the supported
person, rather than an insidious form of concealed paternalism or conflicts of interest. The risk
that apparent supported decision-making really becomes the decision of the supporter looms as
capacities wane (e.g. Neuman 2021). PK&L are alert to these problems but skirt their
implications. Let me start with their reply to the challenge that support arrangements might lead
to abuse and exploitation. They point out quite rightly that this challenge is not unique to
supported decision making; guardians, powers of attorney, and other surrogates may also abuse
and exploit. But in such cases there is no pretense that the dependent individual is speaking for
him or herself; it is clear that the decision maker is someone else and may be subject to explicit
standards such as substituted judgment or best interests.
Moreover, potential problems with the supporter are not limited to abuse and
exploitation. PK&L also quite rightly recognize that supporters are not just ordinary prostheses.
Unlike limbs or calendars, supporters are not “cognitively inert” and “might influence the
beneficiary in positive or negative ways.” Paternalistic pressures are unlikely to be viewed as
abuse, however; they protect the individual from what may be risky or ill-advised decisions. But
they undermine the goals of supported decision making.
The example of Jake mutes the force of this observation. Jake is introduced early in the
course of his predictably worsening dementia. He still understands his values and at least the
general types of decisions to be made. He is able to identify the supporters who, he believes,
will most appropriately help him in drawing the connections that he eventually may no longer
make for himself. To take the analogy of a calendar: he understands that there will be periods of
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time to be filled in, and he has a general sense of the kinds of events he will want to place in
these periods. As his capacities fade, he will continue to be able to value in the sense outlined by
Agnieszka Jaworska (1999, 110): having ongoing commitments to critical interests “in doing or
having in our lives the things we consider good and in avoiding the things we consider bad.”
The role of the supporter then will be to help Jake fill in the outlines of these values. It will not
be to introduce new values or possibly even to weigh values very differently. For example,
suppose that Jake has always been the kind of person who has taken physical risks to enjoy the
out of doors: an extreme back country skier or mountain biker. When the time comes to decide
whether Jake can continue to live independently, a protective supporter might try to steer him to
a living situation that limits his ability to be outside to prevent his wandering. Or suppose that
Jake has given a great deal to make life better for others, sometimes sacrificing his own physical
comforts to help others in economic need. A supporter might caution Jake against entering a
clinical trial involving some physical risk or even discomfort. Neither of these efforts by the
supporter could be characterized as abuse, but arguably neither would reflect Jake’s critical
interests.
The centerpiece of PK&L’s article is a three-step model for supported decision-making.
The model involves first identifying the domains of life for which support is needed or desired
(or will be; the process is iterative). Here, Jake will need to identify whether supports should
address health care decisions, financial decisions, or other types of decisions, depending on the
anticipated course of his diminishing capacities. Next, the model requires identifying the kinds
of support that will be necessary; examples of kinds of support are communication and
interpretation of information, developing a network of supporters, and “developing a life vision.”
Finally, the agreement must be formally established. With the potential exception of
“developing a life vision,” this model largely addresses processes for support rather than the
substantive content of the decisions to be made with support.
What is involved in “developing a life vision” for a supported person? PK&L do not say;
instead, they cite Bigby et al. (2017). But the article by Bigby and colleagues does not enlighten.
This article reviews pilot programs in Australia to ascertain what support for decisions have been
developed and how their effectiveness has been evaluated. It is descriptive; for example, one of
its findings is that “supporters were expected to have attributes such as respect for the rights,
values, goals and experiences of each individual.” Another is that “[l]ittle was available about
the expected practice of providing decision making support, although this was to some extent
implicit in the training materials which alluded to things such as: supporting decision makers to
take risks, change their minds, make decisions others may not like, and extend their
experiences.” Still another was that common barriers included the challenges of finding “a
balance between respecting a person’s autonomy, supporting their dignity of risk and ensuring
their safety.” Nowhere does the article discuss what might be involved in developing a life
vision for a supported person, or even how programs do or could evaluate whether a supported
life visioning process is anything other than the supporter’s vision for the person.
The example of Jake is importantly misleading in this respect, especially if PK&L’s
model of supported decision is to be extended beyond persons such as Jake who were once
robustly capacitated decision makers. Jake is a person who has been a successful oncologist with
a recently deceased life partner. He is estranged from his siblings but has good friends, features
of his life that likely are at least to some extent shaped by his critical interests. Jake presumably
has a life vision; for him, the process of creating supportive arrangements consists in finding the
help that will enable him to continue to carry out this vision. But the model presented by PK&L
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may be inadequate even for Jake. Its three steps—identifying the scope of the support, outlining
the types of support, and formalizing the arrangement—do not include any form of guidance
about what decisions may be acceptable. Supportive arrangements following the model give no
way of ascertaining whether a supported decision is by and with, rather than for, the supported
person (Francis & Silvers 2007). In this respect, the model may be even less helpful than
documents for creating powers of attorney that invite their maker to give further guidance and to
discuss what they would want with their potential future decision maker. This may be true even
for PK&L’s core case: a person like Jake who is able to anticipate the realities of diminishing
capacity. In sum, PK&L’s account ignores a critical fourth step in a model for support:
establishing guidance for assuring that decisions made with support actually reflect the decisions
of supported person, rather than the concerns of the supporter, however well-intentioned these
may be.
One final, more general concern. PK&L “argue that the ideal decision-making model for
individuals like Jack is supported decision making.” They do not say whether their model is
meant to be the best model for individuals like Jake in the messy, often unjust world in which
health care is delivered today, or whether their model is an aspect of what has been called “ideal”
theory (e.g. Valentini 2012). The social model of disability on which they rely arguably is firmly
rooted in non-ideal theory: on the social model, deficiencies in world-design are the disability to
be addressed, not the bodies of the persons who must function in the world in which they live.
These deficiencies, to be sure, are not always unjust, but the social model at a minimum opens up
questions of whether barriers are “needless,” unjust, or to be altered for other reasons. These
questions perhaps must be addressed for supported decision making as well. Contexts of
injustice may matter to whether and how supported decision making is preferable to other
structures for attempting to ensure that decisions are made by and with, rather than for, people
with cognitive disabilities.
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